Prudence is the faculty which deals with what is just and noble and good for man, i.e. 2, 2best of all things. One swallow does not make a summer, Crisp: the human good turns out to be activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are several virtues, in accordance with the best and most complete. Peters1893: I. also I. For so soon as we retaliate we are relieved: vengeance makes us cease from our anger, substituting a pleasant for a painful state. Peters1893: IX. Peters1893: X. 13, 7But it is plain that unless pleasure—that is, unimpeded exercise of the faculties—be good, we can no Edition: current; Page: [246]longer say that the happy man leads a pleasant life; for why should he need it if it be not good? Happiness, then, extends just so far as contemplation, and the more contemplation the more happiness is there in a life,—not accidentally, but as a necessary accompaniment of the contemplation; for contemplation is precious in itself. It seems, as we said, that what is chosen or purposed is willed, but that what is willed is not always chosen or purposed. Peters1893: VI. And so prodigals are held to be very worthless individuals, as they combine a number of vices. Peters1893: VI. 10, 3Temperance, then, will be concerned with the pleasures of the body, but not with all of these even: for those who delight in the use of their eyesight, in colours and forms and painting, are not called either temperate or profligate; and yet it would seem that Edition: current; Page: [92]it is possible to take delight in these things too as one ought, and also more or less than one ought. Survey him point by point and you will find that the notion of a high-minded man that is not a good or excellent man is utterly absurd. supra, 7, 8. i.e. Those faculties and those motions or activities which do not admit of excess beyond what is good,* do not admit of excessive pleasure; but those which admit of excess admit also of excessive pleasure. And it is just the same with the virtues also. For instance, when a man is drunk or in a rage he is not thought Edition: current; Page: [63]to act through ignorance, but through intoxication or rage, and yet not knowingly, but in ignorance. 1.: In all he does man seeks same good as end or means. the man who can say, in the words of the poet—. Peters1893: I. But in the case of politics, while the sophists profess to teach the art, it is never they that practise it, Edition: current; Page: [352]but the statesmen. 13, 4Because fortune is a necessary condition, some people consider good fortune to be identical with happiness; but it is not really so, for good fortune itself, if excessive, is an impediment, and is then, perhaps, no longer to be called good fortune; for good fortune can only be defined by its relation to happiness. But of appetite we may say what the poets say of Aphrodite: “Craft-weaving daughter of Cyprus;” or what Homer says of her “embroidered girdle,”, “Whose charm doth steal the reason of the wise.”*. Now, praise* or blame is given only to what is voluntary; that which is involuntary receives pardon, and sometimes even pity. Peters1893: X. We have already spoken of the characters that are displayed in social intercourse in the matter of pleasure and pain; let us now go on to speak in like manner of those who show themselves truthful or untruthful in what they say and do, and in the pretensions they put forward. Peters1893: VIII. )* [Let us now turn to question (1).]. Plainly, then, a just man will mean (1) a law-abiding and (2) a fair man. 3, 7But this is not the case with all pleasures; for there is no previous pain involved in the pleasures Edition: current; Page: [324]of the mathematician, nor among the sensuous pleasures in those of smell, nor, again, in many kinds of sights and sounds, nor in memories and hopes. Peters1893: VII. Peters1893: IV. Virtue and vice according to Aristotle are "up to us". Peters1893: VII. 2, 7, and X. Ethics, as now separated out for discussion by Aristotle, is practical rather than theoretical, in the original Aristotelian senses of these terms. by blows or by fear; for in a wood or a marsh they do not attack man. If then this element be not submissive and obedient to the governing principle, it will make great head: for in an irrational being the desire for pleasant things is insatiable and ready to gratify itself in any way, and the gratification of the appetite increases the natural tendency, and if the gratifications are great and intense they even thrust out reason altogether. as foolhardiness seems more similar to courage and nearer to it, and cowardice more dissimilar, we speak of cowardice as the opposite rather than the other: for that which is further removed from the mean seems to be more opposed to it. It is evident too that the degree in which the descendants are related to their ancestors may vary to any extent. Now, the desired result will be brought about if requital take place after proportionate equality has first been established.*. Peters1893: VIII. Peters1893: I. By possible I mean something that can be done by us; and what can be done by our friends can in a manner be done by us; for it is we who set our friends to work. However, not everyone who runs from a battle does so from cowardice. Peters1893: IX. With these friendships are classed family ties of hospitality with foreigners, types of friendships Aristotle associates with older people. Once again turning to the divinity of happiness Aristotle distinguishes virtue and happiness saying that virtue, through which people "become apt at performing beautiful actions" is praiseworthy, while happiness is something more important, like god, "since every one of us does everything else for the sake of this, and we set down the source and cause of good things as something honored and divine". The English version of the title derives from Greek Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια, transliterated Ethika Nikomacheia, which is sometimes also given in the genitive form as Ἠθικῶν Νικομαχείων, Ethikōn Nikomacheiōn. Peters1893: III. He acts voluntarily (for in a manner he knows what he is doing and with what object), and yet is not bad: for his purpose is good; so he is only half bad. But by life we must not understand a bad or corrupt life, or a life of pain; for such a life is formless, as are all its constituents. As he proceeds, he describes how the highest types of praise, so the highest types of virtue, imply having all the virtues of character at once, and these in turn imply not just good character, but a kind of wisdom. 11, 6But, on the other hand, when our friends are in trouble, we should, I think, go to them unsummoned and readily (for it is a friend’s office to serve his friend, and especially when he is in need and does not Edition: current; Page: [316]claim assistance, for then it is nobler and pleasanter to both): when they are in prosperity, we should go readily to help them (for this is one of the uses of a friend), but not so readily to share their good things; for it is not a noble thing to be very ready to receive a benefit. A physician does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, nor a statesman whether he shall make a good system of laws, nor a man in any other profession about his end; but, having the proposed end in view, we consider how and by what means this end can be attained; and if it appear that it can be attained by various means, we further consider which is the easiest and best; but if it can only be attained by one means, we consider how it is to be attained by this means, and how this means itself is to be secured, and so on, until we come to the first link in the chain of causes, which is last in the order of discovery. And the like occurs in other matters also. THE GREAT WORKS (fragments) Fragment #1 — Comm. 8, 8of arms for both purposes. Peters1893: III. Peters1893: V. 5, 16It is evident that, before money came into use, all exchange must have been of this kind: it makes no difference whether you give five beds for a house, or the value of five beds. Again, in the domain of art voluntary error is not so bad as involuntary, but it is worse in the case of prudence, as it is in the case of all the virtues or excellences. [58], To have the virtue of greatness of soul, and be worthy of what is greatest, one must be good in a true sense, and possess what is great in all virtues. Money making, which Aristotle asserts to be a life based on aiming at what is pursued by necessity in order to achieve higher goals, an intermediate good. Peters1893: III. It is the institution of the state which gives a permanent significance to these amusements of a day. 3, 1The pleasure or pain that accompanies the acts must be taken as a test of the formed habit or character. And so by doing just acts we become just, and by doing acts of temperance and courage we become temperate and courageous. Heraclitus also says, “Opposites fit together,” and “Out of discordant elements comes the fairest harmony,” and “It is by battle that all things come into the world.” Others, and notably Empedocles, take the opposite view, and say that like desires like. 1, 37But illiberality is incurable; for old age and all loss of power seems to make men illiberal. 2, 1There are some further questions that here suggest themselves, such as whether the father’s claims to service ought to be unlimited, and the son should obey him in everything, or whether in sickness he should obey the physician, and in the election of a general should choose him who is skilled in war; and, similarly, whether one ought to help one’s friend rather than a good man, and repay a benefactor rather than make a present to a comrade, if one cannot do both. 7, 13): for the end is not outside the means; happiness or the perfect life is the complete system of these acts, and the real nature of each act is determined by its relation to this system; to choose it as a means to this end is to choose it for itself. 3, 14Sometimes we have to find out instruments, sometimes how to use them; and so on with the rest: sometimes we have to find out what agency will produce the desired effect, sometimes how or through whom this agency is to be set at work. 1, 7Our problem, then, is to find what each of these faculties becomes in its full development, or in its best state; for that will be its excellence or virtue. Peters1893: X. In his Metaphysics, Aristotle described how Socrates, the friend and teacher of Plato, had turned philosophy to human questions, whereas Pre-Socratic philosophy had only been theoretical. And so it is plain that not all ends are final. "[77] In a famous statement, Aristotle makes a point that, like many points in Book 5, is thought to refer us to consideration of Plato's Republic.